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R E L I G I O U S N A T I O N A L I S M IN T H E M O D E R N I Z A T I O N
PROCESS
S T A T E S H I N T O A N D N I C H I R E N I S M IN M E I J I J A P A N

MICHIAKI OKUYAMA
NANZAN INSTITUTE FOR RELIGION AND CULTURE, JAPAN

In his 1993 book, The New Cold War?: Religious
Nationalism
Confronts
the Secular State, the American sociologist, Mark
Juergensmeyer, draws attention to the rise of religious nationalism and
argues for a closer look at the phenomenon, both in its history and its
contemporary form.
He begins the story of the relationship between religion and nationalism in the West, with the transition from the medieval to the modern
period, in which the former dominance of Roman Catholicism was challenged by a plurality of Protestant denominations. The ensuing depoliticization of the Catholic Church led to the modern separation of church
and state, and was also, we may assume, a further stimulus to the
process of secularization that had already been set in motion. By the
18th century, the autonomous nation-state had established itself on the
pillars of a new form of nationalism, "secular nationalism," as
Juergensmeyer calls it. He summarizes the relation between secular
nationalism and the nation-state this way:
The changes of the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries included
the development of the technical ability to knit a country together
through roads, rivers, and other means of transportation and communication; the construction of the economic ability to do so, through an
increasingly integrated market structure; the emergence of a world
economic system based on the building blocks of nation-states; the
formation of mass education, which socialized each generation of
youth into a homogeneous society; and the rise of parliamentary
democracy as a system of representation and an expression of the will
of the people. The glue that held all these changes together was a new
form of nationalism: the notion that individuals naturally associate
with the people and place of their ancestral birth (or an adopted homeland such as the United States) in an economic and political system
identified with a secular nation-state.'

Juergensmeyer goes on to note the curious coincidence of Western
religions becoming less political as secular nationalism was becoming
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more religious. In line with thinkers such as Alexis de Tocqueville and
Ernst Cassirer, who pointed out the religious aspects of the French and
American Revolutions, he adds:
As in France, American nationalism developed its own religious characteristics, blending the ideals of secular nationalism and the symbols
of Christianity into what has been called "civil religion."

In the 19th and 20th centuries, this blend of secular nationalism
with religion spread across the world as part of the ideology of nationbuilding that was taking place in the former colonies of Asia, Africa,
and Latin America. The relationship between religion and secular
nationalism was no longer merely an issue for Western nation-states in
this period, but a worldwide problem.
Japan was no exception. Just how the religious factor figured in
Japan's efforts to organize itself into a modern nation-state from the late
19th to the early 20th century is a complex question. Here I would like
to focus on two particular forms of religious nationalism that had a role
to play in the process: State Shinto and Nichirenism.
Japan makes an interesting case for the comparative study of modernization. Seated on the fringes of East Asia and possessed of its own
distinctive cultural heritage, it came face to face with the modern reality of international relations in the mid-19th century, not after any struggle for independence from Western dominance, but after a self-imposed
seclusion that had cut it off for more than 200 years from both the outside Asian, as well as Western worlds.
That said, the distinctive Japanese culture that faced the challenge
of modernization was already an amalgam of indigenous and foreign
influences. This is especially evident in its religious culture, so much so
that even the most identifiably indigenous religious traits took shape
only in response to the arrival of religious traditions and customs from
abroad: Buddhism from the 6th century onwards and Christianity from
the 16th century, until its prohibition during the period of seclusion. Be
that as it may, for our purposes here, we may consider State Shinto as
representative of indigenous Japanese religiosity, and Nichirenism as
representative of an originally foreign Buddhist tradition, accommodated to the needs and realities of Japan. The relationship between these
two traditions is essential to understanding the religious situation in
Japan past and present.
"National Religion" in Japan
Before discussing religion and nationalism in modern Japan, it is
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worth mentioning the idea of a "national religion," a concept that the
historian Bito Masahide proposed, to describe the fact of a single, unified religion comprised of multiple coexistent traditions: Buddhist,
Shinto, and folk.' This unified religion, Bito argues, took shape in Japan
roughly during the 15th and 16th centuries. This was a period when the
archipelago was in transition from an era of fragmented, warring states,
to one of incipient national unity. Though not yet a centralized nationstate, Japan faced the dawn of the modern age with a relative degree of
political unity, overseeing the self-governance of local village and town
communities. The emergence of the local community was not only a
political factor, but brought other cultural innovations with it in language, literature, and entertainment, as well as in the realm of religion.
From the time of its introduction into Japan in the 6th century,
Buddhism interacted with native religious customs, resulting in a syncretistic mixture of Buddhism and the worship of local gods.
Meanwhile, both through its confrontations with, and also under the
positive influence of foreign Buddhism, the cult of indigenous Gods
underwent a process of self-understanding that reached a level of theoretical refinement by the Middle Ages.
As we come to the early modern period and the rise of the
autonomous local community, we find Shinto shrines being erected in
these communities for the religious needs of ordinary people. Thus
around the 15th and 16th centuries, what we now call "Shinto" was a
communal religion with a distinctive set of ideas, facilities, and ritual
practices. Despite the hierarchical structure of pre-modern society,
which also affected the relationship between a shrine and its followers,
patterns of worship were fairly uniform from the imperial family (worshiping at the Ise shrine) to the Tokugawa shogunate family (worshiping at the shrine of Nikko T5sh5g) to the village local community (worshiping at a local shrine).
During almost this same transitional period, Buddhism was finding
its place among the common people, reflected in the construction of a
large number of temples in local communities. Each of the numerous
Buddhist sects that had developed in Japan attempted to establish relationships with its adherents by taking as a foundation the existing relationship between local temples and their affiliated households. (The traditional Japanese social structure of the household, or ie, is also considered to have taken shape around this time.) The bonds between the
Buddhist temple and the household increasingly came to focus on concern with death and afterlife, leading to the phenomenon of "funeral
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Buddhism," that has survived in the funeral rites and memorial services of today. Like Shinto, Buddhism reached beyond regional and class
differences to spread to the whole of Japan. But by concentrating on
death rituals, in effect it accepted a kind of division of labor with Shinto.
Bit5 explains:
The tendency is to think of the religious situation at the time in terms
of the coexistence of two distinct traditions, namely, Buddhism and
the cult of the Gods (Shinto). But we can also think in terms of the
integration of the two in individual belief where people entrusted their
fate in the afterlife to the Buddha, and their fate in this world to the
Gods. 4

From the standpoint of strict Buddhist orthodoxy, the increasing
importance put on funeral rites and the accompanying cult of the ancestors may seem heretical. From a wider perspective, it can be read as a
sign of the increasing consciousness of the deceased as individuals still
belonging to the household. To accommodate this shift, Buddhism had
to accept a number of elements from popular belief and practice, elements that were also adopted by Shinto. This is an instance of what Bito
sees as a single, unified, "national" religion, comprised of Buddhism,
Shinto, and folk religion, and supported by the individual consciousness
of belonging to a community, whether at the level of the household or
the local society.
Bito's idea of "national religion" in Japan is helpful, and indeed
one of the leading religious studies scholars of Japan today, Shimazono
Susumu, begins an account of the shift in the structure of religions—or
what he calls a "cosmology-ideology complex"—of modern Japan by
referring to Bito's essay.5 Like others, however, he reads the term
"national" as a strictly geographical qualification that does not imply
any shared consciousness of national citizenship. In any case, we may
accept Bito's idea of a Buddhist-Shinto synthesis as solid ground from
which to view Japanese religions as a whole. More concretely, the reality of a "national religion" forms the backdrop against which nationalistic religions emerge in modern Japan.
The Invention of a New Religion
Modern history typically draws a distinction between tradition and
modernity. But if the tradition itself should turn out to be an invention
of the modern age, the distinction collapses, or at least needs to be
redrawn. The British historian, E. J. Hobsbawm, explains the idea of
"invented tradition" in an introductory chapter to a collection of essays
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on the subject: "Invented tradition" is taken to mean a set of practices,
normally governed by overtly or tacitly accepted rules of a ritual or
symbolic nature, which seek to inculcate certain values and norms of
behavior by repetition, which automatically implies continuity with the
past.6
From a number of general observations on the invented traditions
of the period since the industrial revolution, he comes up with a tripartite classification of rough and overlapping types: 1) those establishing
or symbolizing social cohesion or the membership of groups, real or
artificial communities; 2) those establishing or legitimizing institutions,
status or relations of authority; and 3) those whose main purpose was
socialization, the inculcation of beliefs, value systems, and conventions
of behaviour. 7
In a word, the suggestion is that the invented traditions in the modern age are basically related to the establishment of social relations of a
community, the legitimatization of authority, and the regulation of
belief and behavior.
Hobsbawm concludes with mention of one of the special concerns
of the modern and contemporary historian with invented traditions:
"They are highly relevant to that comparatively recent historical innovation, the 'nation,' with its associated phenomena: nationalism, the
nation-state, national symbols, histories and the rest." 8
Referring in particular to the case of France, he specifies:
Whatever the historic or other continuities embedded in the modern
concept of 'France' and 'the French'—and which nobody would seek
to deny—these very concepts themselves must include a constructed
or 'invented' component. And just because so much of what subjectively makes up the modern 'nation' consists of such constructs and is
associated with appropriate and, in general, fairly recent symbols or
suitably tailored discourse (such as 'national history'), the national
phenomenon cannot be adequately investigated without careful attention to the "invention of tradition."'

The idea of the modern nation as an invention of tradition
would seem a useful tool for understanding Japan's experience of modernization process, as certain recent scholarship in the field would suggest.10 This is not the place to go into detail, but I cannot pass over one
coincidence that comes to mind. In 1912 (the last year of the Meiji and
the first year of the Taisho era), the British Japanologist and linguist,
Basil Hall Chamberlain (1850-1935), published a short booklet entitled
The Invention of a New Religion."
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Though a mere 27 pages, the piece is an important witness of the
changing religious scene at the time. Beginning from the common
assumption that the Japanese are unreligious or agnostic, he notes that
"this same agnostic Japan is teaching us at this very hour how religions
are sometimes manufactured for a special end—to subserve practical
worldly purposes." He calls these "manufactured religions" Mikadoworship and Japan-worship, in other words, the 20th-century Japanese
religion of loyalty and patriotism, and explains the manufacturing
process this way:
The twentieth-century Japanese religion of loyalty and patriotism is
quite new, for in it pre-existing ideas have been shifted, altered, freshly compounded, turned to new uses, and have found a new centre of
gravity. Not only is it new, it is not yet completed; it is still in process
of being consciously or semi-consciously put together by the official
class, in order to serve the interests of that class, and, incidentally, the
interests of the nation at large.12

Among "the pre-existing ideas" he mentions the monarchal throne
and the primitive nature cult of Shinto connected to the imperial family.13 As Japanese politics and militarism prospered with victories in the
Sino-Japanese war of 1894-95 and the Russo-Japanese War in
1904-1905, the prestige accruing to the rejuvenated Shinto cult burgeoned. Chamberlain rightly points to the schools as "the great strongholds of the new propaganda," where history—or rather, "the national
historic legends"—are "so taught to the young as to focus everything
upon Imperialism, and to diminish as far as possible the contrast
between ancient and modern conditions." 14
As to the moral ideal, Chamberlain mentions Bushido, a highminded chivalry, and his following comment on it is more than candid:
As for Bushido, so modem a thing is it that neither Kampfer, Siebold,
Satow, nor Rein—all men knowing their Japan by heart—ever once
allude to it in their voluminous writings. The cause of their silence is
not far to seek: Bushido was unknown until a decade or two ago! The
very word appears in no dictionary, native or foreign, before the year
1900. Chivalrous individuals of course existed in Japan, as in all
countries at every period; but Bushido, as an institution or a code of
rules, has never existed.15

According to Chamberlain, the new Japanese religion of loyalty
and patriotism, one of whose ideals was crystallized in the form of
Bushido, can be regarded as an invention manufactured in a rather short
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space of time. He summarizes:
The new Japanese religion consists, in its present early stage, of worship of the sacrosanct Imperial Person and of His Divine Ancestors,
of implicit obedience to Him as head of the army (a position, by the
way, opposed to all former Japanese ideas, according to which the
Court was essentially civilian); furthermore, of a corresponding belief
that Japan is as far superior to the common ruck of nations as the
Mikado is divinely superior to the common ruck of kings and emperors.16

Chamberlain credits the Japanese bureaucracy with the invention of
"the new cult, with all the illiberal and obscurantist measures which it
entails." And in response to those who might doubt that "not even officials can be so stupid as to believe in things which they have themselves
invented," he answers: "People can always believe that which it is
greatly to their interest to believe.'" 7 Here, in 1912, we see Chamberlain
claiming that the Japanese bureaucrats were inventing a new religion of
loyalty and patriotism under the authority of the emperor. As it turned
out, the invention was to survive until 1945, when imperial Japan was
defeated in the World War II. The "new religion," of which
Chamberlain spoke, would later be identified in the postwar period as
"State Shinto," a key element in any discussion of religious nationalism
in modern Japan. It is to this we turn in the following section.
Emergence of State Shinto
The phenomenon of State Shinto, which Chamberlain considered a
"new religion" in modern Japan, has been the object of numerous studies since being dismantled at the end of World War II. Some of the best
work to appear has been published over the past 15 years. Of the literature available in English, I would single out Helen Hardacre's Shinto
and the State, 1868-1988, a detailed treatment of the relations of Shinto
and the State in modern Japan.
Hardacre, a specialist in modern Japanese religions, uses the term
State Shinto to refer to "the relationship of state patronage and advocacy existing between the Japanese state and the religious practice known
as Shinto between 1868 and 1945.'"8 Her discussion of the beginning
stages of State Shinto after the Meiji Restoration in 1868 takes up a
number of interesting questions, three of which are particularly relevant
to the focus of this essay.
First, an order issued in 1868 and calling for the separation of
Shinto and Buddhism (Shinbutsu hanzenrei) spurred an unofficial
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movement, mainly among Shinto priests, to destroy Buddhist images
and remove them from Shinto shrines (haibutsu kishaku). This movement was active until the mid-1870s. Although the intent of the original
order was to establish Shinto as the sole source of religious principles
for the country and its people, in fact "the separation of Buddhism from
Shinto did not immediately result in the establishment of Shinto as a
fully independent religion."' 9 In the light of our earlier remarks on the
nature of Japan's "national religion," this step can only be seen as an
attempted destruction of religious tradition as it had been in the past.
Second, Hardacre notes how Shinto shrines were ranked institutionally with the purpose of bringing "all shrines in the nation under the
umbrella of the Ise Shrines."20 According to the 1868 hierarchy, the
Shrine at Ise, dedicated to Amaterasu Omikami, who was believed to be
the divine ancestor of imperial family, stood at the top of a pyramid with
other shrines placed below it.
Third, Hardacre refers to the establishment of the Department of
Divinity (Jingikan) in 1868—resurrected from an ancient system dating
back to the 8th and 9th centuries—with the aim of carrying out a national unification of religious rites and government (saisei itch). With its
reconstitution, "a central institution for the administration of religious
affairs and conduct of state rites had become a reality." The rites and
activities conducted by the Department of Divinity included "rites for
the spirits of the imperial ancestors, harvest and New Year's rites, as
well as maintaining the imperial tombs, the cult of the gods of heaven
and earth, and the eight tutelary gods of the imperial house."
No sooner had the Department been set up than it was seen to be
out of line with the demand for religious freedom, an ideal that was
especially urged on Japan from Western countries to protect the work of
Christian missionaries in the country.21 As a result, the Department was
demoted to the status of a ministry (the Ministry of Divinity, Jingishd)
in 1871, and in the following year was reorganized into the Ministry of
Education (Kyobushd).22
Hardacre also takes up other questions related to ritual reform both
in the imperial palace and in the life of common people. The rites performed by Emperor Meiji, including his visit to major shrines (in person, not by proxy) were made public, national holidays were enacted in
line with annual imperial rites, and the rites of local shrines were coordinated with those at the Ise Shrines.23
All of this concerns only the early stages of the formation of State
Shinto, but Hardacre goes on to a broader discussion of the relationship
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between Shinto and the State. It is sufficient here to stress that in its first
years, the new Meiji government tried to turn Shinto into an official
religion of the State, with mixed success. By "religion of the State," I
mean the attempt of the Japanese government to organize, and to
authorize through official government offices set up for the purpose,
doctrines and rituals related to the emperor and the imperial ancestors.
Internally, this meant institutionalizing the hierarchy of shrines throughout the country; externally, it meant clarifying the separation of Shinto
from Buddhism.
Recent scholarship tends to restrict the notion of State Shinto system to an institution established subsequent to the separation of sectarian Shinto (religious sects and authorized after the mid-1870s) from
Shrine Shinto ("state rituals," kokka no sdshi), also, after the establishment in 1900 of a Bureau of Shrines (Jinja kyoku) as distinct from the
Bureau of Religion (Shukyo kyoku), both of which were located within
the Home Ministry.24 The "new religion" Chamberlain refers to seems
to have been coming to birth at his time as a result of these developments, but there is not time here to detail the full development of State
Shinto in this narrow sense. At any rate, the core idea of a State Shinto
created in the Meiji government offers one clear example of religious
nationalism in modern Japan.25 For another example, we turn to
Nichirenism in the Buddhist tradition.
Nichirenism as a Nationalistic Movement
The institutional reform of religion in the early Meiji period tried to
extract Shinto from the "national religion" of Japan, namely, the syncretistic amalgam of Shinto, Buddhism, and folk religion, and to elevate
it to the status of a central ideology under the cloak of "state ritual."
Faced with the backlash of negative sentiment this aroused towards
Buddhism, Buddhist leaders were pressed to find a place for themselves
in this emerging "modern" situation. The whole question of the modernization of Buddhism is too vast even to summarize here. However, it
should be noted that the most remarkable growth was witnessed in
movements and groups (including new religions) deriving from the
13th-century Buddhist reformer, Nichiren (1222-1282), a strong advocate of faith in the Lotus Sutra.26 The ideological side of this movement
has come to be known as "Nichirenism," a term used by the early 20thcentury Buddhist activist, Tanaka Chigaku. 27
Confronted at home by floods, pestilence, famine and other national disasters, and confronted from abroad by the imminent possibility of
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invasion by M o n g o l forces, Nichiren d e v e l o p e d an idea of salvation that
g a v e special i m p o r t a n c e to the nation. His e n g a g e m e n t with the urgent
need of his times to save the nation and its people w a s to be rediscovered and reinterpreted in m o d e r n J a p a n , as S a t o H i r o o notes:
Nichiren was persistent in his involvement with political issues and
state affairs. Insisting on his own religious teaching as the only one
that could bring about peace in the nation, he repeatedly made admonitions to the rulers of the land, aiming at their conversion to his
teaching. This feature of Nichiren's character was played up by
Nichirenists of the modem period to project and establish his image
as an ardent nationalist. 28
E l s e w h e r e Sato o p e n s a treatment of w h a t he calls " T h e Period of
N i c h i r e n i s m " with these words:
When we consider the various movements in thought and society that
have taken place in modern Japan, we cannot do so without taking
into account the influence of Nichiren. Included here is an intellectual movement derived from Nichiren, "Nichirenism," begun by Tanaka
Chigaku and of overwhelmingly importance in the pre-war period.29
A p p l y i n g a b r o a d e r definition of " N i c h i r e n i s m , " T a m u r a Yoshiro
classifies three types of N i c h i r e n i s m :
The first kind is that which stems from the ardent devotion to
Nichiren on the part of some notable proponents of ultra-nationalistic
and Japanocentric ideas during the height of the militaristic fervor
that led Japan headlong into the Second World War.
The second type refers to the thought-framework promoting the
vision of a transnational, ideal world society based on universal principles taught in the Lotus Sutra and also ascribed to Nichiren.
Socialist-oriented activists and writers during the prewar as well as
post war era represent this kind of thinking.
The third type is that which was espoused by organized religious bodies that drew inspiration from Nichiren's teaching, and appealed to
growing numbers among the masses of people during the same period.30
Tanaka C h i g a k u and his s y m p a t h i z e r s are classified in the first
type, and n e w religious m o v e m e n t s such as Reiyukai, R i s s h o Koseikai,
and S o k a G a k k a i , in the third type. (The second type, omitted here,
w o u l d m a k e an interesting subject f o r study.) Sato takes a d i f f e r e n t tack.
C o n t r a s t i n g Tanaka C h i g a k u and M a k i g u c h i T s u n e s a b u r o ( 1 8 7 1 - 1 9 4 4 ,
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founder of Soka Gakkai), he refers to the former as serving the imperialistic nation of the time, and the latter as defying it, although both were
influenced by Nichiren's thought.51
Here I would like, if only briefly, to look at Nichirenism in its narrower sense, basing my remarks on the recent work by Otani Eiichi.32
We begin by returning to the context sketched above. In the Meiji period, Buddhist sects were obliged to adjust themselves to the modern age,
and the sub-sects derived from Nichiren were no exception. In 1876 the
greater part of these sub-sects merged into one, the Nichiren Sect. All
together, the sects and sub-sects of the Nichiren tradition amounted to
no more than 15% of all Buddhist groups in Japan.33
Tanaka Chigaku (1861-1939), a young monk who had studied
Nichiren's teachings as a teenager, returned to being a layman in 1879
and in the following year, set out to organize a lay Buddhist movement,
which he called the Lotus Society (Renge-kai). In 1884 he reorganized
it under the title Rissho Ankoku-kai (Society for Establishing the Right
and the Peace of the Nation), and again in 1914 as Kokuchu-kai
(National Pillar Society). At first Tanaka was engaged in lecturing to the
general public about Nichiren's ideas, but around 1890 he launched into
a movement aimed at the reform of the Nichiren Sect itself. 1890 was
the year when the Meiji Imperial Rescript on Education was issued, and
in the following decade a lively discussion on the national polity (kokutai) took place in the press and among intellectuals, reaching its peak
after Japan's victory in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895.
With the turn to the 20th century, Tanaka's work took on new fervor. 1902 marked the 650th anniversary of the establishment of
Nichiren's teachings, and representatives from several of the sects in the
Nichiren tradition gathered to commemorate the event. Tanaka was
among them as a guest of honor. As his doctrinal interpretations began
to take clearer shape, Tanaka began to insist that the Lotus Sutra should
be set up as the foundation of a national religion, with the emperor serving as chief petitioner on the ordination platform (kaidan no ganshu).M
In addition, he introduced into his society the practice of bowing
religiously to the imperial family, as well as religious feasts commemorating national holidays modeled after the rituals in the imperial
court.35 By 1910, the concept of Nichirenism (the term was coined by
Tanaka in 1901) was being spread not only through Tanaka's own lectures and publications but also by a number of celebrities, including a
number of scholars and literary figures, 36 and came into vogue among
the public at large as a nationalistic ideology advocating loyalty and
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patriotism. Tanaka himself continued to promote a Nichirenist idea of
the National Polity to support his basic Japanocentrism. The RussoJapanese War of 1904-1905 further intensified his religious nationalism, as Otani describes in great detail.
Such was the situation when the Meiji era in 1912 drew to a close,
which was also about the time that Chamberlain was writing about the
invention of a "new religion" of loyalty and patriotism. Besides the religious nationalism of State Shinto (Shinto itself, it should be recalled,
was a modern construct as well), we also see religious nationalism
emerging within the Buddhist world in the form of Tanaka's
Nichirenism, not to mention the other intellectual currents and social
movements suggested by Tamura's tripartite classification. Together
these show how Shinto and Buddhism produced nationalistic movements through collaborating with and reacting against the modernization process in Japan.
Closure of the Meiji Era
The Meiji era came to an end on 30 July 1912 with the death of
Emperor Meiji. At the announcement of his serious illness ten days
before, a number of prayer ceremonies were conducted by various religions, including not only Shinto and Buddhist groups but also Christian
and new religious movements like Tenrikyo. Other secular associations
of women, youth, and the like, as well as local townsfolk, visited Shinto
shrines to pray for the emperor's recovery." Following his death and a
period of national mourning, funeral services were performed on 13
September at a specially constructed site in Tokyo, not at a Buddhist
temple in Kyoto, traditionally connected to the imperial family. The
next day the coffin was transported by train to Kyoto for burial.
Taking Kanagawa Prefecture as an example, Nakajima Michio
describes the way the deceased emperor was mourned by the ordinary
people: hanging black curtains in their homes, wearing black bands on
their sleeves, coming together for memorial services at a local school or
town hall, and gathering to see off the train bearing the emperor's
remains as it passed through the region.38 Nakajima explains that even
though participation in these events was made obligatory by the state,
people by and large participated willingly—something that under normal circumstances would have been most unusual.
He concludes that the funeral left a deep impression on the minds
of the country that the emperor is a special being, and that by taking part
in the event they reconfirmed their identity as subjects of the nation that
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so revered him. In a word, "the great funeral of Emperor Meiji played
an important role in the integration of the Japanese people by the
Japanese state."39
The memory of Emperor Meiji, both his achievements in life and
the ritualization of his death, was a key element in the formation of religious nationalism in Japan. This immediately raises the wider question
of the place of the modern emperor system in the religious consciousness of the Japanese, a question that takes us beyond the scope of the
present paper.
A fuller portrait of the rise of modern nationalism would have to
take into account a number of other elements, such as the presence of
nationalism in the education system and the debate about the National
Polity. As far as religious nationalism is concerned, however, the two
examples cited above, set against the backdrop of the wider tradition of
religious pluralism, offers a promising subject for the comparative study
of religious nationalism in the modern world.

This essay was originally presented at the 31 st annual meeting of the
International Society for the Comparative Study of Civilization, held at
Port Antonio, Jamaica, on 31 May 2002. An earlier version appeared in
the Bulletin of the Nanzan Institute for Religion & Culture, 26, Spring,
2002: 19-31.
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